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1 Introduction 
Cooperative Game Theory can be a useful tool in modelling situations in which economic 
agents cooperate. In many reallife situations the problem of al10cating joint profits and cost 
occurs. This paper develops an analytical rnodel-garne for analyzing how to divide the profits 
when some associated firms produce with a Cobb-Douglas technology, and how to divide the 
cost of a public good in proportion to benefits that agents derive from this good. 
A new class of games in charaeteristic form, Ceneralized Externality Carnes are intro-
duced in this papero These new cooperative games have al1ocations belonging in the care, 
and therefore no coalition S will unanimously decide to chal1enge it since there is no way 
to divide v(S) so as to make every member of S better off. Sorne of these al1ocations, for 
example Shapley Value and the Proportional Solution, solve problems such as sharing profits 
or costs, in sorne way, among the participants of a generalized externality game. 
Morover, this new class of games, can be a useful tool in theoretical explanations of why 
rational individuals participate in groups with fees. The players do not wish simply to be 
identified within a group, but they also wish to be included, because the jointness of presence 
itself provides a benefit. For example, in a football game each agent pays a ticket, but the 
game is more exciting when the ground is full (one's presence benefits the rest of agents). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce sorne concepts of cooperative 
game theory. In Section 3, we define a new class of games, Ceneralized Externality Carnes, 
and introduce sorne properties, showing that they are balanced games. In Seetion 4, we 
present two subclasses of Ceneralized Externality Carnes. We define the a-generalized exter-
nality games and the constant-generalized externality games. We show that the a-generalized 
externality games are average convex games. In Section 5, we analyze an allocation in the 
core of generalized games, the Proportional Solution, and we present an axiomatic charac-
terization of this last solution. In Section 6, we study the fol1owing economic applications: 
Cobb-Douglas production Games and the Provision of a One-Dirnensional Public Cood. In 
this section performs, sorne simulations for particular values of the characteristic funetion 
are performed in order to investigate optimal distributions of total worth of a a-generalized 
externality game. In Section 7, we consider the link between a model, which incorporates 
relational goods, and the improvement made by each player in a generalizaded externality 
game due to the fact that the presence of a player benefits the rest of the players. Conclusions 
are given in Section 8. 
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2 Preliminaries and basic definitions. 
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set and v is a fundion from 2N 
on ~ called charaeteristic funetion, such v(0) = O. The elements of N = {1,2.. } are called 
players, the subset S E 2N , with 2N = {S \ S e N S i- 0} are called coalitions and v( S) is 
the worth of the coalition S. Let f N be the set of all games (N,v), called n-person games. 
In most interesting economic applications, the fundion v is superadditive or monotonic, 
so that it is efficient for the players to form the grand coalition, N. 
A game v E f N is called superadditive if: 
v(S) + v(T) ::; v(S U T) , for all coalitions S n T = 0. 
A game v E f N is called monotonic if: 
v(S) ::; v(T) ,for all coalitions S E T. 
Since the introduction of cooperative games, the problem most extensively studied in 
cooperative game theory is how to divide the total earning of the grand coalition if all 
players cooperate. 
A solution on f N is a fundion 'P defined from f N into RN , such that ¿iEN 'Pi(v) = v(N) 
(this property is called efficiency). 
Among the most popular multivalued concepts, the core proposes a very compelling 
solution. Formally, the core of the game is the set 
C(v) = {x E RN x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ~ v(S) V S e N}, 
where x(S) = ¿iES Xi, for all S. 
If an allocation belongs to the core, no coalition S will unanimously decide to challenge 
it since there is no way to divide v(S) so as to make every member of S better off. 
So thus, is very interesting to study the core of games cooperatives. We purpose in this 
paper games with non-empty coreo We will make use of following definitions and results for 
to show that the core of those games is non-empty: 
Definition: A collection B of coalitions is said to be balanced if there exist positive 
numbers T s, for all S E B (weights) such that, for each i E N, 
LTs = 1. 
SES 
¡ES 
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Definition: An n-person game v, with player set N, is balaneed if, for every balaneed 
eoHection E, with balaneing weights Ys, 
¿ y sv(S) :::; v(N). 
Sef3 
Theorem l(Bondareva 1963, Shapley 1967): A game (N, v) has a non-empty eore iff it 
is balaneed. 
We first provide suffieient eonditions for the balaneedness of a generalized externality 
game, whieh we will be define in the next section. 
Other solution is the Shapley value. Shapley (1953), defined a value for games to be a 
funetion that assigns to eaeh game v a number <Pi (v) for eaeh i in N. He proposed that sueh 
a funetion obey three axioms (symetry axiom, earrier and additivity axiom). He showed 
that this unique value <I> = (<Pi)ieN is 
<Pi(V) = ¿ (s -1)!~n - s)! [v(S) _ v(S\{i})]' 
SeN n. 
¡ES 
with s = card(S) and n = card(N). 
The eore of an n-person game is the set of feasible outcomes that eannot be improved 
upon by any eoalition of players. Shapley (1967), showed that the eore of a eonvex game is 
non-empty and the Shapley value of a eonvex game is an element of the eore. 
Definition: A game v E f N is eonvex if: 
v(S U {i}) - v(S) ~ v(RU {i}) - v(R), 
for aH S e N R e S Vi rt S. 
So for eonvex games the marginal eontribution of eaeh player to a large eoalition is higher 
then his marginal contributation to a smaHer eoalition. But eonvexity is a strong requeriment 
and games that extend the convexity notion have been studied in the literature of cooperative 
games: For example, Iñarra and Usategui (1993), introduced the average convex games. 
Definition: A game v E f N is average eonvex if: 
¿v(T) - v(T\{i}) ~ ¿v(S) - v(S\{i}), 
ieS ieS 
for aH S e T. 
They obtained for average eonvex games a interesting result: 
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Theorem 2(Iñarra and Usategui, 1993): The Shapley value oJ an average convex games 
lies in the coreo 
In this paper we study a class of games which is average convex and Theorem 2 will be 
used in Seetion 4, and we compute sorne element of the core of that average convex games. 
We want to tackle sorne economic problems with game theoretic techniques. To do so, we 
define a new class of game in characteristic function formo Really, we consider a generalized 
of a class of game called ExternaHty games. GraJe et al. (1993), introduced the Externality 
Games, but they did not obtain economic interpretation fram them. 
Definition : A game v E f N is said to be an Externality Games if there exists a 
vector f3 = (f3i)iEN E R~\ {a} and non decreasing funetion r : {1, 2, ...n} ---+ R+ such that 
v(S) = f3(S)r(s) with s = card(S). 
We introduce a generalized of these externality games and we obtain a class of games 
with sorne economic applications. 
3 Generalized Externality Games. 
We define a new class of cooperative game and we study sorne properties. In the next 
sections, we obtain economic interpretations from these generalized of externality games. 
We call to this class of games Generalized externality games. 
Definition: A game v E f N is a generalized externality game if there exists a vector 
TI E R~\{a}, TI = (7r)iEN and a real scalar a ~ 1, and a non decreasing funetion, h, with 
h : {1, 2, ...n} ---+ R+ , such that the payoffs are defined by: 
v(S) = rrO(S)h(s), 
where rrO(S) = O:=iES 7ri)O , and s denotes the cardinal of S. 
This class of games is denominated generalized externality games because the contribu-
tion of the player to a coalition is twofold. On the one hand, each player contributes with his 
particular endowment, 7ri. On the other hand, his presence benefits the rest of the players 
(Grafe el al., 1993). 
We denoted these games by (rrO, h) E GEN, 
In the following propositions sorne properties of these games are examined. 
First, we prove that it is efficient for the players to form the grand coalition, N. 
5 
-----.--.-----,-------------r---------~--------------------_. 
Proposition 3.1 : The games GEN are superadditive and monotonic. 
Proof.- To show that a GEN game is superadditive we use the fol1owing procedure: 
1et (ITO<, h) E GEN be a game, let S and T be coalitions T then 
v(S) +v(T) = (¿1rith(S) + (¿1rith(t) 
iES iET 
By the faet that h is non decreasing we obtain that 
(2: 1rith(s) +(¿ 1ri)O<h(t) ~ [(2: 1ri)O< +(2: 1ri)O<]h(s + t). 
iES iET iES iET 
If we appied properties as (a + b)O< ~ aO< + bO< for al1 a E ~+, a ~ 1, to a = IT(S) 
and b = IT(T) we obtain, 
[(¿ 1ri)O< +(¿ 1ri)O<]h(s + t) ~ [¿ 1ri +¿ 1ri]O<h(s + t) = 
iES iET iES iET 
= [( 2: 1ri)O<]h(s + t) = v(S U T). O 
iEsuT 
The monotonic property is a direet consequence of the superadditive property applied to 
T= 0. O 
Proposition 3.2: The games GEN are not convexo 
Proof.- Consider the fol1owing counter-example. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, rr = (1,2,20), a = 2 
and non decreasing funetion h given by h(1) = 1, h(2) = 3, h(3) = 4. O 
Proposition 3.3: If we do not require any conditions on the funetion h, then the games 
GEN are not average convexo 
Proof.- Our purpose is to prove, with a = 1, that given a game (ITo<, h) occurs the 
fol1owing condition (no average convex): 
¿v(T) - v(T\{i}) ~ ¿v(S) - v(S\{i}). 
iES iES 
Equivalent1y, 
¿[¿ 1rj h(t) + ¿ 1rj h(s - 1)] ~ ¿[¿ 1rj h(s) + ¿ 1rj h(t - 1)]. [1] 
iES JET jES\{i} iES jES jET\{i} 
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If we defined the non decreasing funetion hfoHowing: 
h(t - 1) = h(t) = h(s) = 1, 
h(s-I)<1. 
then we obtain, 
for aH al, a2, 131,132 such that al +a2 = 131 + 132. 
Given that foHowing equality always holds, 
¿iET 7rj + ¿jES\{i} 7rj = EjES 7rj + ¿jET\{i} 7rj, for aH i E S. 
We can conclude that the inequality [1] holds with the hdefined in this proof. 
If [1] holds then the games with characterist funetion v(S) = (¿iES7ri)Qh(s) are not 
average convexo O 
Since the introduction of cooperative games, the most interesting problem studied is how 
to divide the total earning of the grand coalition if aH players cooperate. Many different 
solution concepts have been proposed for n-person games in charaeteristic funetion formo 
We shaH be concerned here with one of them: the coreo 
We want to prove that the core exists, so we can use the Bondareva and Shapley Theorem. 
First we require, 
Lemma 1: Sea h be a non-decreasing funetion, a real scalar a 2: 1 and ¿iES 7ri > 
¿iET 7ri then 
(¿iEW 7ri)Q h(W ) (¿iET 7ri)Q h(t) 
,,-- > '"' ' LJiEW 7ri LJiET 7ri 
for aH W, T such that card(W) > card(T). 
Proof.-
Let W, T be such that card(W) > card(T), and ¿iEW 7ri > ¿iET 7ri'  
The funetion f(x) = xQ - l is increasing when a 2: 1 then, 
(¿ 7ri)Q-l > (¿ 7ri)Q-l , 
iEW iET 
and so, (¿ 7ri)Q-lh(w) > (¿ 7rit-lh(t). O 
iEW iET 
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Theorem 3.4 Generalized externality games are balaneed. 
Proof.- Let B be a balaneed eol1eetion, with weights Y s. 
¿Ysv(S) = ¿Ys(¿ 7riY'h(s) = 
SEB SEB iES 
where the last inequality íol1ows from Lemma 1 applied to W = N and T = S O 
Remark: If B = {SI, S2""} then 
Eaeh player belong to any Sj j = 1,2 ... , then 
Corollary 3.5: The eore 01 a generalized externality game is non-empty. 
Our first result shows that there do exist, at least, a íeasible outeome that eannot be 
improved upon by any eoalition oí players. There is no way to divide v(S) so as to make 
every member oí S better off. 
Total1y balaneed games were defined by Shapley and Shubik (1969) as those al1 oí whose 
subgames have nooempty eores. They also proved that these games are the same as market 
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games, which are generated by exchange economy the utility funetions of whose traders 
are continuous and concave. Ano~her charaeterization of total1y balanced games provided 
by Kalai and Zemel (1982), who proved that they coincide with those games that can be 
expressed as the minimum of a finite col1ection of additive games. From this result they 
obteined that every total1y balanced game is a flow game, i.e. a game associated with a 
direct network in such a way that the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum source 
to sink flow that can be sent by using only the edges which are owned by the members of the 
calition. Other caraeterization of total1y balanced games in terms of their associated indirect 
functions was introduced in Legaz (1992). This author studied a dual representation for n-
person cooperative games, cal1ed the indirect funetion, which are characterized as certain 
nonincreasing polyhedral convex funetions and many concepts in the theory of cooperative 
games can be easily expressed in terms of indirect funetions. In the case of monotone games, 
the relationship between characteristic and indirect functions takes a simpler formo 
Let us observe that Generalized Externality Games are balanced games and they admit 
a simple charaeterization in terms of indirect functions, since the core of (IJtl', r) can be 
represent in terms of its. We will study in a next paper a dual representation of Generalized 
Externality games based on indirect function. 
4 Special cases of Generalized Externality Games. 
In this Section we study two cases from generalized externality games, we do sorne restrictions 
on the function h. We will present, in Seetion 6, sorne economic il1ustration of these cases. 
We present the mathematical results that will be applied to the analysis of cooperative games 
in the fol1owing seetions. 
Let N be the set of players, a vector TI E ~N and a real scalar o: 2: 1. 
We must consider two fol1owing case: 
i) Let h be a non-decreasing function defined by 
where s = card(S) and a E ~+. 
ii) Let h be a constant function defined by 
h(s) = K, 
where s = card(S) and K E ~+. 
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These cases can define two classes of generalized externality games, which we develop in 
the next subseetions. 
4.1 O"-Generalized Externality Games 
We study this case because the worth of a a-generalized externality game, v(S), can compute 
the maximum quantity of output that can be produced by any coalition S with a Cobb-
Douglas technology. 
Definition 4.1.1: A game (IP,h) E GEN is a a-generalized externality games if h is 
non decreasing funetion, such that 
with a E ~+ and s = card(S). 
Remark: Now the charaeteristic funetion is v(S) = (¿iES 1l"i)asO". 
We prove that these games are a particular case of average convex games, which strietly 
include convex games, and then we can use the Theorem 2. It shows that the Shapley value 
is in the core of a - GEN' 
Proposition 4.1.2 The a-generalized externality games are average convex games. 
Proof.- To show this proposition we follow the same procedure in l' narra and Usategui 
(1993). 
Given S e T, and a game (rra , h) E GEN. 
We need to prove that 
¿[rra(s)sO" - rra(S\{í})(s _1)0"]::; ¿[rra(T)tO" - rra(T\{í})(t _1)0"], 
iES iES 
The last inequality is equivalent to 
sso"rra(s) - ¿rra(S\{i})(s -lr ::; stO"rrC>(T) - ¿[rra(T\{í})(t _1)0", 
iES iES 
We prove first that 
sto"rra(T) - ¿[rra(T\{í})(t -lr 2: sto"rra(S) - ¿(t -l)o"rra(S\{í}). [3] 
iES iES 
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Then 
¿IJC~(T) - Jr~(T\{i}) ~ ¿IJC~(S) - IIa(S\{i}). 
iES iES 
The last inequality is equivalent to 
sIIa(T) - sIIa(S) ~	 ¿ IIa(T\ {i}) - IIa (S\ {i}). 
iES 
Then, we obtain the inequality [3], 
tU[srra(T)-sIIa(S)] ~ tU[¿IIa(T\{i})-IIa(S\{i})] ~ (t-1t[¿IIa(T\{i})-IIa(S\{i})]. 
iES iES 
To complete the proof we show that 
stUIIa(S) - ¿(t -1)u IIa(T\{i}) ~ ssUIIa(S) - ¿IIa(S\{i})(s -lt. [4] 
iES iES 
Always, 
-1 _ ¿iESII(S\{i}) 
s - IJ(S) . 
If a ~ 1, we have 
¿ II(S\{i}) > ¿(II(S\{i})t.  
iES II(S) - iES II(S) 
Then, (s -l)IIa(s) ~ ¿iESIIa(S\{i}), and 
(s -l)[(t -lt - (s _l)U]IIa(S) ~	 ¿IIa(S\{i})[(t _l)U - (s -lt]. 
iES 
We must show that 
If the last inequality occurs then we show [4] and the proof ends. 
We consider the followig funetion, r(t,s) = s(r - SU). 
The inequality ,that we need to prove, holds if the last function defined satisfy this 
conditions: 
If we applye the Mean Value Theorem 1 
lthe * means scalar producte 
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¡r'(t,.s)- f'(t-1,s-1) = (V' f"")(t' s,)*(t-(t-1), s-(s-l)) = 88f ' (t', s')l+ 88f ' (t', s') 1. [5]
, t s 
We need to prove that the expression [5] is greater or equal than O. This inequality holds if 
and only if: 2 
{:::::::? ~ > t( O" + 1) 
s(1 - sO" + t 
If consider g(O") - :r:. _ t«(1+1)
- sl7 S(1+t . 
So g(O) = O , 
If we compute that g(0") ~ O then we obtain that the inequality [5] ~ O. 
We apply the Taylors expansion, we have that:  
g(o") = g(O) +g'(O) (O" - O) + g'~f) (o" - 0)2, 
We must prove that each member in the sum is non negative: 
In particular, g'(O) = t 2 - ¡~(:;;) ~ O. 
We have that,  
"( ) = (L ( / ))2( /)(1 (t 2 - ts)2s(sO" + t)9 o" n t s t s + (so" + t)4 . 
In particular, g"(O ~ O 
So as, g(0") ~ O implies that the expression [5] ~ O holds, then we have shown that 
the generalized externality game, whose characteristic function is v(S) = (II(S)t s(1, VO" E 
~+ a ~ 1 , is an average convex games. O 
Proposition 4.1.2 allows to study sorne properties of the core of this o" - GEN games. A 
direct consequence of Shapley Theorem (1953) is this result: 
Corollary 4.1.3: The Value Shapley of a o" - GEN is an element of the coreo 
2We denote (t',s') as (t,s) , now (t,s) is fixed. 
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4.2 Constant-Generalized Externality Games 
In this subsection we study a class of generalizaded externality games, which are illustrated 
with sorne applications, for example, we study that the worth a constant-GEN , v(S), can 
compute the surplus generated by coalition S if they hdve to pay the full cost of a divisible 
public good. 
Definition 4.2: A game (II(\ h) E GEN is a constant-generalized externality games if 
the function h is such that 
h(s) = K, 
with s = card(S), K, E ~+. 
Remark: Now the characteristic function is v(S) = (EiES 7l"i)QK, , for all coalition S. 
This class of games will be used in Section 6, there we will develop the relationship 
between this class of games and a general economic model where the agents share the cost 
of sorne abstract public decision. 
We can compute the nucleolus for this case of games (with a = 2). The nucleolus 
(Schemeidler, 1969) is the vector of payoffs that minimizes the maximal complaint of the 
coalitions in the following way. The excess (or complaint) of a coaliton S e N, S i- 0, 
with respect to a vector of payoffs x E ~N is defined by e(S, x) = v( S) - I:iES Xi. The 
excess vector of the payoff vector X is e(x) = (e(Sl' x), ... , e(S2N, X)), where the excesses are 
arranged in a decreasing order. The lexicographic order on ~N is denoted by 5:.L. Hence, 
for X, y E ~N we have X 5:.L y if and only if there exist a k E {O, 1, ... ,n} such that Xi = Yi 
for all i 5:. k and Xk+l < Yk+l' The nucleolus V(N, v) of a game (N, v) is the unique vector 
of payoffs for the game that minimizes e(x) with respect to the order 5:.L' 
As proved in ArÍn (1995), for games called (a, 2) the nucleolus is defined by Vi( a, 2) = 
h(a~ + ai(Ei#j aj)), where v(S) = h[a(SW and h is a positive constant. 
5 The Proportional Solution. 
One of the main topics dealt with in cooperative game theory is given a game v, to divide 
the amonunt v(N) between the players if the grand coalition N is formed. Many solutions 
concepts have been proposed to handIe this problem. In this Section we study a element of the 
care, which is well-Known solution concepto First, we define a vector, call the proportional 
solution and then we prove that this solution belong to core of the generalized externality 
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garnes. 
Let N be a set of players. Consider a generalized externality garne (ITO', h) with a char-
acteristic funetíon defined by v(S) = O:=iES 7l"i)O'h(s). 
Definition 5.1: A vector x E ~N is called a proportional solution for (ITO', h) if each 
coordenate is defined by: 
Xi = ¿ 1l"j _v(N) , for all i E N. 
iEN1l"1 
Proposition 5.2: A proportional solution of a generalized externality game is an element 
of the coreo 
Proof.-
First, we rnust prove that the vector x is well-defined. It is inrnediate. 
We deve10p the propieties of an e1ement of the core: 
i) ¿iEN Xi = v(N) 
This equality is trivial. 
ii) ¿iES Xi 2: v(S), for all S e N. 
Now we have the following expression: 
It is well known that the funetion f( x) = XO'-l with a 2: 1 is non decreasing. Then 
(2: 7l"it- 1 2: (2: 7l"i)O'-l. 
iEN iES 
Appliying the last inequality to expression [6] we obtain, 
2: Xi 2: v(S) f or all S e N. o 
iES 
6 Applications: 
6.1 The provision of a One-Dimensional Public Good. 
We introduce a general model (Moulin, 1992) where the agents share the cost of sorne abstraet 
public decision. There is a divisible private good (money) used to produce public decisíons. 
14 
---T---,---------------
We denote M an upper bound on anyone's endowment of money. 
From now on the agents are assumed to produce a single divisible public good, A = 
[O, +00]. Denote by c(a) the cost of producing decision a E A. The cost function c is 
continuous, increasing in a such that c(O) = 0, c(+00) = oo. 
The set of agents jointIy choosing a decision in A is N = {1, 2 ... n}. A feasible outcome 
is a vector (aj yI, ... ,YN) where: 
a E A Y¡:::; M for all i and ¿¡ENY¡ = c(a). 
Agents i's utility ui(a,y¡) is continuous, increasing in a and decreasing in y¡. 
Consider the following case: Quadratic Cost and Linear Utilities. 
We take c(a) = a2/2 and ui(a,y¡) = (3ia - Yi, where the parameter (3i is agent i's 
marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods. 
Consider the following game 1: 
Let N = {1, 2, ... , n}, the coalitions S e N, and the characteristic function v(S) such 
that, 
2a
v(S) = maxa>o L(3i a --, 
¡ES 2 
The worth of v(S) compute the surplus generated by coalition S if they have to pay the 
full costo If we consider the last game 1 defined as a constant-generalized externality game3 , 
we have that the proporcional solution lies on the coreo 
Note that Xi, proportional solution, is: 
The Lindahl equilibrium solution is: 
Total surplus a = ((3N)2 /2 ; cost share Yi = (3i(3N /2, with (3N = ¿iEN (3i. 
With this result, it is easily seen that the Lindahl solution is in the core (the proportional 
solution is in the core). That solution divide the total cost of a public good between N agents 
just as the proportional solution divide the total worth of the surplus generated by N agents, 
who pay the full cost of a public good. 
3The characteristic function is v(S) =rr"(S)h(s) where rr"(S) =¿iES(!3i)2 and h(s) = 1/2. 
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For a constant generalized externalility games given by v(S) = IP(S)(1/2) the nucleolus 
coincides with the Shapley value. This result was obtained by AfÍn (1995), where both values 
can be easily expressed. 
6.2 Cobb-Douglas Production. 
Consider n firms N = {1, ... ,n} who can cooperate to produce a singlejoint producto The 
product is assumed to be perfeetly divisible. For each subset of firms S ~ N, let v(S) be the 
total amonunt produced by S when theagents in S joint their skills or recourses. We assume 
that nothing is produced for free; that is v(0) = O. Every firm participates in produetion 
with capital and labour, which we denote by .\ and r¡i, respeetively. 
Thus, the resources owned by coalition S are: 
.\(S) = sA r¡(S) = ¿ r¡i. 
iES 
We will assume that output q is obtained according to the following Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology with increasing returns to scale (/3 ~ 1) : 
The maximum quantity of output that can be produced by any coalition S will be 
v(S) = f(.\(S),r¡(S)) = A,V'SQ(¿r¡i)í3. [7] 
iES 
The Cobb-Douglas produetion games 4 present a characteristic function given by the 
expression [7] and it is inmediately shows that these games are a particular case of a a-
generalized externality games. 
If the produetion q is provided by a group of firms, then the profits that are generated 
by the output 5 have to be divided, in some way, among the participants. The goal of this 
subseetion is to analyse this type of cooperative problems. 
We can model some situation of cooperation between firms as a Cobb-Douglas Produetion 
Game, afterthat we use game theoretic solutions concepts studied for a-generalized external-
ity games. For example, we study two allocations belonging in the core: The Shapley Value 
4Iñarra E., Usategui J. (1993) consider a nonlinear production game, namely a type oí Cobb-Douglas 
Production Games with increasing returns to scale. 
5The output can to be sold at a given market price. 
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and the Proportional Solution. To use the value Shapley or Proporcional Solution depends 
on the specific features of the firms and the properties that are required on the cooperation. 
In many reallife situations the problem of allocating joint profits occurS. In this Section, 
we solve an example where the production function is approximate1y a Cobb- Douglas. We 
present the results for simulations of the Cobb- Douglas game, where the parameters have 
been chosen that the technology must display increasing returns to scale. 
Example and simulation: 
Three retailers from Almeria have established a association call Asociacion comerciante 
del poniente in order to build a hypermarket. This is a proyect developed, managed and 
financed by retairles. They decided to meger in order to prevent a French multionational 
to get the conccession of this proyecto The invesment of 1200 millions of pesetas and 600 
workers needed to put the hypermarket into operation is solely financed by 3 partners. The 
output (the value of hypermarket huilt with capital and labour) will divide between retailers, 
and we can use the Shapley value or proportional solution (both are optimal distributions). 
We asume that A = 400 millions of pesetas (the each firm's capital), T}l = 100, T}2 = 200 
and T}3 = 300 (the each firm's labour) and the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas are a = 1 and 
{3=1. 
TABLA 1 
Coalitions (1) (2) (3) (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (1,2,3) 
Payoffs 40000 80000 120000 240000 320000 400000 720000 
Shapley Value 180000 240000 300000 - - - -
Proportional solution 120000 240000 360000 - - - -
As can be seen from the Table 1, the case considered is with increasing return to scale. 
Observing Table 1, we have: 
a) Any coalition act together will get no less than that when they act independent1y; 
Obviosly, v(N) is then the largest amount of payoff that the player can possibly obtain. 
b) The Shapley value and the proportional solution be10ng to core of this u-generalized 
externality game. 
Remark: We give two different way to distribute thejoint maximum payoff v(N) among 
aH the n players. 
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7 Link between the relational goods and GEN games. 
Uhlaner (1989) develops a model, which incorporates a set of objetives, ca11ed relational 
goods.6 
First, we make a brief summary about the relational goods, and next we study the 
conneetion between these goods and the generalized externality game. 
People pursue relational goods which cannot be acquired by an isolated individual. In-
tead, these goods can only be posessed by mutual agreement that they exist after appropiate 
joint actions have been taken by a person and non-arbitrary others. For a relational good a 
person's utility increases both as his or her own consumption increases and as the consump-
tion of sorne specific other person or member of a defined set of people increases. Relational 
goods are a subset of local public goods, however the jointness of consumption itself provides 
a benefit, and congestion can increase utility (A footba11 game is more exciting when the 
ground is fu11). 
The analysis of relational goods suggest circumstances under which participation is ratio-
nal, for example, under sorne cicumstances persons will be more likely to aet if they believe 
others will aet, contrary to free-rider logic. 
Uhlaner describe that relational goods can be categorized along two dimensions: By 
whether contaet among those interaeting is direet or indirect, and by whether the goods are 
instrumental or consumption goods. 
In this Seetion, we explore the link between the instrumental relational goods and gener-
alized externality games. Relational instrumental goods depend upon sorne policy outcome; 
For example, if action by one's group bolsters the group's political identity and individual 
participation is necessary as an entry ticket to claim group identity, there exists a relational 
instrumental good: the individual's share of augmented group identity. The feeling of being 
a real member of sorne group may be socia11y defined as requering certain aetions. In this 
way, the individual does not get the benefit of the co11ective good without belonging to the 
group, and acting establishes a claim to membership. 
We can think that the new class games defined in this paper (generalized externality 
game), ad also, suggest that individuals derive utility from the aet of cooperation, so no 
only each player contributes with his endowment but his presence in order to increase the 
benefits to the rest of the players. A generalized externality game can reinforcement of sense 
of belonging to a group (my presence is important to the rest of the players, they are my 
group and they want to include me). 
Uhlaner shows that the concept of relational goods fi11s in key gaps in the most promesing 
explanations of participation, we can say that the generalized externality games show that 
each player helps the cause or the group by being counted, his presence increase the total 
worth of game, it benefit the group (the rest of players) and then it can explain that the 
6These goods depend upon interactions among persons. 
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people participate in sorne actions, belong to politics group (they know that his presence 
benefits to the rest rnernbers of group). Indead, they share of the augrnented group identity 
if they participate in a generalized externality garne. 
8 Conclusions. 
The preceding sections have defined a new class of cooperatives garnes, cal1ed generalized 
externality garnes. We prove that these garnes are balanced, that is, are garnes with a non-
ernpty coreo We study sorne al1ocations belongs to the core, sueh as proportional solution 
and the Shapley value. We obtain sorne applications of these garnes: The division of the 
surplus generated by a group if they have to pay the ful1 cost of a divisible public good, 
and the distribution of the output when consider a group of firrns who can cooperate to 
produce a single joint product with Cobb-Douglas technology. Final1y, we express the idea 
that the players share of augrnented group identity (each player helps by being counted) if 
they participate in a generalized externality garne. 
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